Guilty Plea Not Knowing and Voluntary

Except as indicated, all indented material is copied directly from the court’s opinion. 

Decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court

Decisions of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Clemmons v. State, No. M2022-00560-CCA-R3-PC, p. 24-25 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2023).

Hampton v. State, No. W2022-01473-CCA-R3-PC, p. 11 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. July 19, 2023).

Weaver v. State, No. E2022-00228-CCA-R3-PC, p. 5-6 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. May 3, 2023).

Thomas v. State, No. E2022-00160-CCA-R3-PC, p. 9-10 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2023).

Mumphrey v. State, No. W2021-01439-CCA-R3-PC, p. 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2023).

The Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides an avenue for relief “when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of proving his or her allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f). For evidence to be clear and convincing, “it must eliminate any ‘serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” Arroyo v. State, 434 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 404 (Tenn. 2012)).

In this case, the Petitioner generally alleges that he did not understand his guilty plea or its terms. Our supreme court has recognized that “[t]he validity of a guilty plea is a mixed question of law and fact.” Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010). As such, our review of whether the Petitioner entered a valid guilty plea in this case is also de novo, applying a presumption of correctness only to the post-conviction court’s findings of fact. Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tenn. 2020).

When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she “waives several constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers.” State v. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2003). As such, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that “a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 465 (Tenn. 2010); see Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246, 253 (Tenn. 2016). Where a defendant’s guilty plea “‘is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process’ and must be set aside.” State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 118 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tenn. 1993)). Thus, a post-conviction petitioner’s claim “which asserts that a plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered, implicates his due process rights and therefore falls squarely within the ambit of issues appropriately addressed in a post-conviction petition.” State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tenn. 2000).

To determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, a court must look to “‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). A defendant cannot make this voluntary and intelligent choice if the decision “results from, among other things, ignorance or misunderstanding.” Nagele, 353 S.W.3d at 118. Thus, before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must canvass “‘the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.’” Garcia v. State, 425 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970)).

Ultimately, the issue of “whether an accused’s plea of guilty was voluntarily, understandingly, and knowingly entered is to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see Rigger v. State, 341 S.W.3d 299, 308-09 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). Our supreme court has recognized several factors that may inform this analysis, including the following:

1) the defendant’s relative intelligence; 2) the defendant’s familiarity with criminal proceedings; 3) the competency of counsel and the defendant’s opportunity to confer with counsel about alternatives; 4) the advice of counsel and the [trial] court about the charges and the penalty to be imposed; and 5) the defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty, including the desire to avoid a greater penalty in a jury trial.

Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 330-31 (Tenn. 2006).

Tate v. State, No. E2022-00147-CCA-R3-PC, p. 11 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2022).

Apart from whether a guilty plea is the product of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is invalid if otherwise made unknowingly or involuntarily. “Whether a plea was knowing and voluntary is an issue of constitutional dimension because ‘[t]he due process provision of the federal constitution requires that pleas of guilty be knowing and voluntary.’” State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tenn. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tenn. 1992)). A plea “may not be the product of ‘[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats.” Wilson, 31 S.W.3d at 195 (alterations in original) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969)); see also State v. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2003) (citing Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993)).

Ford v. State, No. W2022-00247-CCA-R3-PC, p. 5-6 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2022).

A guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered in order to be valid. Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010). The court must determine whether the guilty plea evidences a voluntary and informed decision to pursue a guilty plea in light of the alternative options available to the defendant. Id. In the context of a post- conviction challenge to a guilty plea, both prongs of the Strickland test must be met. Garcia v. State, 425 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tenn. 2013). Thus, to successfully challenge his guilty plea, the petitioner must show counsel’s performance was deficient, and he “must establish a reasonable probability that, but for the errors of his counsel, he would not have entered the plea.” Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 349 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); Garcia, 425 S.W.3d at 257 (Tenn. 2013).

Massengill v. State, No. E2022-00092-CCA-R3-PC, p. 11-12 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2022).

The validity of a guilty plea is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo. Lane, 316 S.W.3d at 562. To enter a guilty plea, an individual must waive his constitutional rights. Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2014). However, in order to be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Lane, 316 S.W.3d at 562 (citing State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1977); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969)). When determining whether a guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, the court must consider “‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Grindstaff, 297 S.W.3d at 218). If a guilty plea is not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, then the defendant has been denied due process, and the guilty plea is void. Id. (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5).

A plea is not voluntary if it is the result of “‘[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats[.]’” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43). In determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered, a trial court must look at a number of factors, which include the following:

1) the defendant’s relative intelligence; 2) the defendant’s familiarity with criminal proceedings; 3) the competency of counsel and the defendant’s opportunity to confer with counsel about alternatives; 4) the advice of counsel and the court about the charges and the penalty to be imposed; and 5) the defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty, including the desire to avoid a greater penalty in a jury trial.

Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 330-31 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904).

“[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such a hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Because such statements carry a strong presumption of truthfulness, a petitioner, in order to overcome this presumption, must present more than “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics” or “contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Id. at 74.

Godfrey v. State, No. M2021-00768-CCA-R3-PC, p. 17-18 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. July 18, 2022).

Whether a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary is a mixed question of law and fact. Jaco, 120 S.W.3d at 830-31. Therefore, in such cases we review the post-conviction court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness. Id. The post-conviction court’s findings of law are reviewed purely de novo. Id.

When reviewing a guilty plea, this court looks to both the federal standard as announced in the landmark case Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the state standard as announced in State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), superseded on other grounds by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b) and Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). Don Allen Rodgers, 2012 WL 1478764, at *5. Under the federal standard, there must be an affirmative showing that the plea was “intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242. Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “the record of acceptance of a defendant’s plea of guilty must affirmatively demonstrate that his decision was both voluntary and knowledgeable, i.e. that he has been made aware of the significant consequences of such a plea . . . .” Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 340. “[A] plea is not ‘voluntary’ if it is the product of ‘[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats . . . .” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43).

In order to determine whether a plea is intelligent and voluntary, the trial court must “canvass[] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. The trial court looks to several factors before accepting a plea, including:

[T]he relative intelligence of the defendant; degree of his familiarity with criminal proceedings; whether he was represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confer with counsel about the options available to him; the extent of advice from counsel and the court concerning the charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to plead guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might result from a jury trial.

Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904; Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 330-31 (Tenn. 2006). Once the trial court has conducted a proper plea colloquy, it discharges its duty to assess the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea and creates an adequate record for any subsequent review. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244.

Statements made by a petitioner, his attorney, and the prosecutor during the plea colloquy, as well as any findings made by the trial court in accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Statements made in open court carry a strong presumption of truth, and to overcome such presumption, a petitioner must present more than “conculsory allegations unsupported by specifics.” Id. at 74.

Marshall v. State of Tennessee, No. W2021-01131-CCA-R3-PC, p. 4 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. May 10, 2022).

On appeal, a postconviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006). Accordingly, questions concerning witness credibility, the weight and value to be given to testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the post-conviction court, and an appellate court may not substitute its own inferences for those drawn by the postconviction court. State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766-67 (Tenn. 2001). However, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

Franklin v. State of Tennessee, No. M2021-00367-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2022).

Post-conviction relief is available “when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103. A petitioner has the burden of proving his factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 40- 30-110(f). A post-conviction court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal, and this Court must defer to them “unless the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings.” Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997); see Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction court’s application of law to its factual findings is subject to a de novo standard of review without a presumption of correctness. Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 457-58.

Yelder v. State of Tennessee,  No. E2021-00633-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2022).

To prevail in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove his factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f); Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999). “Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). On appeal, a post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006). Accordingly, questions concerning witness credibility, the weight and value to be given to testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the post-conviction court, and an appellate court may not substitute its inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court. State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766-67 (Tenn. 2001). However, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).