Continue, Motion to

State v. Bowen, No. M2022-01289-CCA-R3-CD, p. 23 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2023). 

The grant or denial of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2010). An abuse of that discretion requires a showing that the denial of a continuance denied the defendant a fair trial or that the result of the trial would have been different had the continuance been granted. State v. Schmeiderer, 319 S.W.3d 607, 617 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1995)). “The only test is whether the defendant has been deprived of his rights and an injustice done.” Id. The defendant bears the burden on appeal of demonstrating that harm ensued from the denial of the requested continuance. State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 744 (Tenn. 2016) (appendix) (citing State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008)). “Moreover, a defendant who asserts that the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of due process or the right to counsel must establish actual prejudice.” State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11- 12 (1983)). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he defendant demonstrates ‘actual prejudice’ by showing that a continuance would have made relevant witnesses available or added something to the defense.” United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 1997); see also State v. Daniels, 656 S.W.3d 378, 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).

State v. Tharpe, No. E2022-01304-CCA-R3-CD, p 3 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2023). 

“[A] motion for a continuance is addressed to the sole discretion of the trial judge,” and the judge’s decision “will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of gross abuse of his discretion to the prejudice of the defendant.” Baxter v. State, 503 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). It is the appealing party’s burden to show how the trial court’s decision was prejudicial. Id. The critical inquiry “is whether one has been deprived of his rights and whether an injustice has been done.” Id. As a result, the record must reflect that “the denial of the requested continuance ‘denied the defendant a fair trial or that the result of the trial would have been different.’” State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004)).

The grant or denial of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 744 (Tenn. 2016) (appendix). An abuse of discretion requires a showing that the denial of a continuance denied the defendant a fair trial or that the result of the trial would have been different. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004); Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 35. “[A] defendant who asserts that the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of due process . . . must establish actual prejudice.” Odom, 137 S.W.3d at 589 (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)). “The defendant demonstrates ‘actual prejudice’ by showing that a continuance would have made relevant witnesses available or added something to the defense.” State v. Daniels, 656 S.W.3d 378, 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 1997)).

“[A] motion for a continuance is addressed to the sole discretion of the trial judge,” and the judge’s decision “will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant.” Baxter v. State, 503 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 744 (Tenn. 2016); see State v. Goodwin, 909 S.W.2d 35, 44 (Tenn. 1995). It is the appealing party’s burden to show how the trial court’s decision was prejudicial. Baxter, 503 S.W.2d at 230. The critical inquiry “is whether one has been deprived of his rights and whether an injustice has been done.” Id. As a result, the record must reflect that “the denial of the requested continuance ‘denied the defendant a fair trial or that the result of the trial would have been different.’” State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004)); see Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 744; Goodwin, 909 S.W.2d at 44.

The granting of a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004). We will reverse the denial of a continuance only if the trial court abused its discretion and the defendant was prejudiced by the denial. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1995). To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that a different result might reasonably have been reached if the trial court had granted the continuance or that the failure to grant the continuance denied the defendant a fair trial. Id.

The granting of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004). We will reverse the denial of a continuance only if the trial court abused its discretion and the defendant was prejudiced by the denial. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1995). In order to show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that a different result might reasonably have been reached if the trial court had granted the continuance or that the denial of the continuance denied the defendant a fair trial. Id.

Simpson v. State, No. M2021-00216-CCA-R3-PC, p. 3-4 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. June 28, 2022). 

The decision whether to grant a continuance is left to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Russell, 10 S.W.3d 270, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 359 (Tenn. 1982); Baxter v. State, 503 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973)). This Court should “reverse the denial of a continuance only if the trial court abused its discretion and defendant was prejudiced by the denial.” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 392 (Tenn. 2005). “An abuse of discretion is demonstrated by showing that the failure to grant a continuance denied defendant a fair trial or that it could be reasonably concluded that a different result would have followed had the continuance been granted.” Id. (citing State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1995)).