Evidence, Missing or Destroyed (Ferguson Issues)

Except as indicated, all indented material is copied directly from the court’s opinion. 

Decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court

State v. Rimmer, 623 S.W.3d 235, 256 (Tenn. 2021).

To review a trial court’s decision regarding the fundamental fairness of a trial conducted despite missing or destroyed evidence, we apply a de novo standard. State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn. 2013). If we conclude the trial would be fundamentally unfair without the missing or destroyed evidence, then we review the remedy imposed by the trial court for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 791–92.

Decisions of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

State v. McDaniel, No. E2021-00565-CCA-R3-CD, p. 35 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2022).

State of Tennessee v. Morton, No. E2019-01755-CCA-R3-CD, p. 40  (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. June 27, 2022).

In Ferguson, our supreme court addressed “the factors [that] should guide the determination of the consequences that flow from the State’s loss or destruction of evidence which the accused contends would be exculpatory.” Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 914. The court explained that a reviewing court must first determine whether the State had a duty to preserve the lost or destroyed evidence. Id. at 917. “For this duty to arise, the [evidence] must be expected to play a significant role in [the Appellant’s] defense.” State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d 779, 792 (Tenn. 2013). “Specifically, [the evidence] must have potential exculpatory value and be of such a nature that [the Appellant] would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. “If the proof demonstrates the existence of a duty to preserve and further shows that the State has failed in that duty, the analysis moves to a consideration of several factors which should guide the decision regarding the consequences of the breach.” Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917. The factors include:

1. The degree of negligence involved;
2. The significance of the destroyed evidence, considered in light of the probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and
3. The sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the conviction.

Id. (footnote omitted). If the court’s consideration of these factors reveals that a trial without the missing evidence would lack fundamental fairness, the court may consider several options such as dismissing the charges or providing an appropriate jury instruction. Id. We will review a trial court’s decision concerning the fundamental fairness of the trial under a de novo standard. Id. at 790. In the event we determine the trial would be fundamentally unfair in the absence of the lost evidence, we will review the remedy applied by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 791-92.

State of Tennessee v. Crowson, No. M2021-00321-CCA-R3-CD, p. 9 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. May 27, 2022).

Therefore, “[i]f the proof demonstrates the existence of a duty to preserve [evidence that is now missing] and further shows that the State has failed in that duty, the analysis moves to a consideration of several factors which should guide the decision regarding the consequences of the breach.” Id. The applicable factors include: “1) The degree of negligence involved; 2) The significance of the destroyed evidence, considered in light of the probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and 3) The sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the conviction.” Id.

“If, after considering all the factors, the trial judge concludes that a trial without the missing evidence would not be fundamentally fair, then the trial court may dismiss the charges. Dismissal is, however, but one of the trial judge’s options.” Id. “[T]he standard of review of a trial court’s determination as to whether a defendant was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial is de novo with no presumption of correctness.” State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d 779, 797 (Tenn. 2013). “Deference should be given to the trial court’s findings of fact, however, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” Id. Thus, “[a] trial court’s determination of the appropriate remedy for the State’s failure to preserve the evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id.

State of Tennessee  v. Tate, No.  E2021-00217-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2022).

The Tennessee Supreme Court  in State v. Ferguson held that  “the  loss  or  destruction  of  potentially  exculpatory evidence  may  violate  a  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.”   State v. Merriman,  410  S.W.3d 779,  784  (Tenn.  2013)  (citing Ferguson,  2  S.W.3d  at 915-16). The  supreme  court determined that the due process clause under the Tennessee Constitution was broader than the  due  process  clause  under  the  United  States  Constitution and rejected  the  “bad  faith” analysis  adopted  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  which  provided  that  “‘unless  a criminal  defendant  can  show  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  the  police,  failure  to  preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’”   Id. at 78485 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).  Rather, the court in Ferguson adopted  a balancing  approach  requiring  the  trial  court  to  determine  “‘[w]hether  a  trial, conducted without the [lost or] destroyed evidence, would be fundamentally fair.’”   Id. at 785 (quoting Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 914).

When  a defendant  raises  a  Ferguson claim,  a trial  court  must  first  determine “whether  the State  had  a  duty  to  preserve  the  evidence.”   Id.   “[T]he  State’s  duty  to  preserve evidence is limited to constitutionally material evidence described as ‘evidence that might be expected to play a significant  role in the suspect’s defense.’”   Id. (quoting Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d  at  917).   To  meet  the  constitutionally  material  evidence  standard,  “the  evidence must  potentially  possess  exculpatory  value  and  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the  defendant  would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.”   Id.

If  the  proof  establishes  that  the  State  had  a  duty  to  preserve  the evidence and that the State failed in its duty, the court must conduct a balancing analysis, considering the following factors:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. The degree of negligence involved;
            2. The significance  of  the  destroyed  evidence,  considered  in light  of  the  probative  value  and  reliability  of  secondary  or substitute evidence that remains available; and
            3. The sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the conviction.

Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917 (footnote omitted).  The trial court must balance  these  factors  to  determine  whether  a  trial  would  be fundamentally  fair  absent  the  missing  evidence. Merriman,  410 S.W.3d  at  785.  If  the  trial  court  determines  that  a  trial  would  be fundamentally  unfair  without  the  missing  evidence,  “the  trial  court may  then  impose  an  appropriate  remedy  to  protect  the  defendant’s right  to  a  fair  trial,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  dismissing  the charges or providing a jury instruction.”   Id. at 786.

This  court  reviews  the  trial  court’s  decision  regarding  the fundamental  fairness  of  a  trial  conducted  without  the  missing evidence  de  novo.   Id. at  791. The  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  are conclusive  on  appeal  unless  the  evidence  preponderates  against them.   See id. (citations omitted).  This court reviews the trial court’s remedy  for  a Ferguson violation  under  the  abuse  of  discretion standard.   Id.

State v. Terry Craighead and Sinead St. Omer, No. M2017-01085-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5994974, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 15, 2018).

State of Tennessee v. McDaniel, No. E2019-01862-CCA-R3-CD, p. 18-19 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2022).

In  Ferguson, our supreme court addressed the issue of when a defendant is entitled to relief in the event the State has lost or destroyed evidence that was alleged to have been e xculpatory. 2  S.W.3d  at 915-18. The court  explained  that  a  reviewing  court  must  first determine  whether  the  State  had  a  duty  to  preserve  the  lost  or  destroyed  evidence.   Id. at 917.   Ordinarily,  “the  State  has  a  duty  to  preserve  all  evidence  subject  to  discovery  and inspection under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16, or other applicable law.”   Id.   However,

[w]hatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that  duty  must  be  limited  to  evidence  that  might  be  expected  to  play  a significant  role  in  the  suspect’s  defense.   To  meet  this  standard  of constitutional  materiality,  evidence  must  both  possess  an  exculpatory  value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that  the  defendant  would  be  unable  to  obtain  comparable  evidence  by  other reasonably available means.

Id. (quoting  California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984)).

If  the  proof  demonstrates  the  existence  of  a  duty  to  preserve  the  evidence  and  further shows that the State has failed in that duty, a court must proceed with a balancing analysis involving consideration of the following factors:

1. 1. 1. 1. The degree of negligence involved;
         2. The significance  of  the  destroyed  evidence,  considered  in  light  of  the probative  value  and  reliability  of  secondary  or  substitute  evidence  that remains available; and
         3. The sufficiency  of  the  other  evidence  used  at  trial  to  support  the conviction.

 Id. (footnote  omitted).   If  the  court’s  consideration  of  these  factors  reveals  that  a  trial without  the  missing  evidence  would  lack  fundamental  fairness,  the  court  may  consider several options such as dismissing the charges or providing an appropriate jury instruction.  Id.   This  court  reviews  the  trial  court’s  decision  concerning  the  fundamental  fairness  of  a trial conducted without the missing evidence under a de novo standard of review.   State v. Merriman,  410  S.W.3d  779,  791  (Tenn.  2013).   We  review  the  appropriateness  of  the remedy provided by the trial court under an abuse of discretion.   Id.